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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
KENNETH L. ANDERSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 14650 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceedings in which the 
defendant, Kenneth L. Anderson, was charged with the crime 
of Automobile Homicide a Felony of the Third Degree on 
information filed in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendant was tried without a jury before 
the Honorable Allen B. Sorenson, District Judge, on May 12, 
1976, and found guilty of Automobile Homicide. On June 4, 
1976, the defendant was ordered to be confined in the Utah 
State Prison for an indeterminate term of not to exceed five 
years. 
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I 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have his conviction reversed 
or a new trial granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 29, 1976, an auto accident involving 
.two cars occurred in Utah County at about 3:00 a.m. on State 
Road 214 just east of Spanish Fork* (T. 9) As a result of 
this accident Sherry Lynn Forsythe was killed. 
At the beginning trial of the appellant, Kenneth 
Anderson, the parties stipulated that after the analysis 
of the appellant's blood, it was found to contain 0.22 percent 
blood alcohol by weight. (T. 4) 
The State's primary witness at the trial was 
Trooper Blair Bradford of the Utah Highway Patrol. (T. 9 to 48) 
He testifed that he arrived at the scene after the accident 
and that he observed two trucks, a Toyota pick-up truck with 
a small camper on the back and a Chevrolet pick-up truck. 
(T. 10) The two trucks were "mashed in together side-by-side 
facing northbound on the road". (T. 10) In the Toyota 
pick-up he found the victim Sherry Lynn Forsythe who was 
already dead and her husband. 
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The Trooper observed the appellant at the scene 
and he asked the appellant if he was the driver of the other 
vehicle. The appellant responded affirmatively. (T. 13) 
After observing the defendant and reaching the conclusion 
that the defendant was intoxicated, the Trooper placed the 
defendant under arrest for Automobile Homicide. (T. 15) 
The Trooper also testified that there was another individual 
in the passenger side of the Chevrolet pick-up truck. (T. 17) 
The officer testified that the two vehicles had 
struck head-on and that based on the "critical curve" 
developed from the skid marks left by the Chevrolet pick-up 
truck, that vehicle was traveling at the speed of 60 miles 
per hour immediately prior to the accident in an area with 
a speed limit of 55 miles per hour. (T. 34) 
State's Exhibit II, introduced at the trial and 
received by the trial court (T. 22 and 35), is a diagram made 
by Officer Bradford on the night of the accident. The diagram 
shows that the road where the accident had taken place con-
sisted of two lanes in the victim's direction of travel and 
two lanes in the lane of travel of the Chevrolet vehicle. 
In between the opposing lanes of travel was an "island", a 
portion of the road which was marked by painted yellow lines. 
The Trooper stated that he was of the opinion, based on his 
observations, that the Chevrolet pick-up truck left his lane, 
came across the painted island into the lane of traffic of the 
on-coming Toyota pick-up. (t. 27) The point of impact of the 
vehicles occurred in the island portion of the highway at a 
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point where the island was about 7f-2M wide. The officer 
testified that the Toyota pick-up truck had not had the 
brakes applied before collision. (T. 28) 
On Cross-examination, the officer stated that 
the Chevrolet pick-up truck was owned by the person who was 
found injured in the passenger side of the pick-up truck 
at the scene of the accident. (T. 45). He also admitted 
on cross-examination that the estimate which he had made 
concerning speed could have been off approximately five miles 
per hour and that there was no evidence of speeding by the 
pick-up truck. (T. 48) 
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I. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL JUDGE AS 
TRIER OF FACT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION 
OF THE APPELLANT. 
The State in this case had the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following elements of 
the crime of Automobile Homicide: 
(1) While under the influence of an 
intoxicating liquor 
(2) To a degree which rendered him 
incapable of safely driving a 
motor vehicle 
(3) Operated a motor vehicle in a 
negligent manner 
(4) Causing the death of another 
(5) While acting with criminal negligence 
While Utah Code Annotated 76-5-207 does not expressly 
employ the term "criminal negligence?l, a plain reading of general 
provisions of the Code and the general provisions of the Criminal 
Homicide section of the Code clearly mandates that the degree 
of negligence referred to in 76-5-207 is criminal negligence 
and not "ordinary" or "simple" negligence which is the proper 
standard. The Utah Legislature in enacting the new Automobile 
Homicide Statute (Utah Code Annotated 76-5-207 enacted by L. 1973, 
Chap. 196; and L. 1974, Chap. 32, Section 11) expressly re-
pealed the former statute (Utah Code Annotated 76-30-7.4, re-
pealed by L. 1973, Chap. 196). 
The State has charged the appellant with Criminal 
Homicide and not with an offense under the traffic code. The 
general provisions of the Criminal Homicide Section of the 
Code, Utah Code Annotated 76-5-201 (Supp. 1975) provide: 
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(1) A person commits criminal homicide if 
he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, 
or with criminal negligence unlawfully 
causes the death of another, 
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the first 
degree and second degree, mansalughter, 
or negligent homicide, or automobile 
homicide. (Emphasis added) 
The Utah Legislature has set forth a statutory 
scheme for the offenses categorized as criminal homicide 
and has specified four requisite mental states, for the 
offenses of criminal homicide. 
The appellant contends that the above quoted 
section standing alone lead to the conclusion that criminal 
negligence is an essential element of Automobile Homicide. 
However, additional authority for this proposition is 
found in the following provision of the Utah Criminal Code: 
76-2-101. Requirements of Criminal Conduct 
and Criminal Responsibility.-—No person is 
guilty of an offense unless his conduct is 
prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, reck-
lessly or with criminal negligence with respect 
to each element of the offense as the definition 
of the offense requires; or — • 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving 
strict liability. 
Unless Automobile Homicide is a strict liability 
offense, the element of criminal negligence is the least 
culpable mental state that must exist in relation to each 
element in order that a person can be found guilty of a 
criminal offense under the code. The language of the 
Automobile Homicide statute is not subject to any reasonable 
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The evidence presented at the trial does not 
support the trial court1s finding that under the reasonable 
doubt standard the defendant acted with criminal negligence, 
that the defendant caused the accident, or that the defendant 
operated a motor vehicle in a negligent manner. Furthermore, 
as explained in Point II of this brief, the trial judge as 
the trier of fact should not have considered the defendant's 
admission made at the scene because the State had not established 
the corpus delicti. 
The appellant contends that the judgment of the 
lower court in this matter be set aside and the case be 
reversed in order that a judgment can be entered which is 
consistent with the evidence. 
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I 
failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime independent 
of his admissions. In Cazier, the evidence showed that the 
defendant was driving the vehicle which caused the death of 
the victim that the defendant was intoxicated, and that the 
defendant's truck had crossed over the center line for a 
considerable distance, 260 feet, before striking the victim's 
car in the victim's lane of traffic. This court held that 
the facts in that case were adequate proof of the corpus 
delicti of the crime independent of the defendant's admission. 
In the present case, as brought out in Point I 
of this Brief, the evidence introduced at trial as to the 
corpus delicti was not as extensive as the evidense intro-
duced in Cazier. In this case, there was no sufficient 
independent evidence that an offense was in fact committed 
or the defendant was operating the motor vehicle. The 
State failed to adequately prove several elements of the 
offense and the trial judge committed prejudicial error 
in considering the defendant's admission as trier of fact 
in the absence of proof of the corpus delicti. 
Therefore, the judgment should be reversed and a 
new trial granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RANDALL T. GAITHER 
^ < T I T \ r t P f T J 
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